Vermont Yankee Sale: Local groups happy, CLF objects again

Almost Everyone Agrees

Entergy plans to sell Vermont Yankee to NorthStar for decommissioning.  As you can imagine, this plan has led to lots of discussions and hearings, and I have even written a few blog posts about it.

The last time I wrote about this proposed sale was right before the April 12 hearing before the Vermont PUC. (Thursday Meeting on Sale of Vermont Yankee)  In March, all parties (state agencies, Native American tribes, intervenors) signed off on the agreement between Entergy and NorthStar, as detailed by Mike Faher at Vermont Digger. (State, NorthStar strike deal for sale of Vermont Yankee).  At the April 12 hearing, supporters of the sale were clearly in the majority.  Supporters dominate meeting on sale of Vermont Yankee. (Article by Faher)

Oh, did I say "all parties" had signed off on the agreement?  Wrong. My bad. The Conservation Law Foundation refused to sign the agreement. In March, I predicted that CLF would do everything in their power to make the sale fall through.  I was right.

Sleeping Beauty

This reminds me of the Sleeping Beauty fairy tale, where fairies are giving their gifts to a newborn princess, but one fairy feels slighted.  That fairy's gift is a curse: the young princess will prick her finger on a spinning wheel and die. Another fairy partially reverses the curse. The girl will fall asleep for 100 years instead of dying.  Thus begins the story of Sleeping Beauty.

CLF is planning something similar. I don't know if they actually feel slighted, but I think they sure plan to kill the deal. If they succeed, like the girl in Sleeping Beauty, the VY power plant will be in SafStor for many many years. Sixty years. The economic development of the town will sleep for more than a generation.

The people of southern Vermont and the people of Vernon want a clean site and a new employer in Vermont. They are hoping this change will happen soon, not sixty years from now.  But when a powerful creature like CLF feels slighted, what are you going to do? A creature like that can stop time.

She pricked her finger on the spindle
Art by Anne Anderson

Lawyers and Ventures

Okay, all that was just a metaphor.  CLF is not a magical evil creature.  And it is not unstoppable.  Basically, CLF is a not-for-profit law firm (Conservation Law Foundation) and an associated "Ventures" group.

 CLF claims that the companies involved in the VY sale have not released "even a page of their contract to the public."  CLF also admits that they could have read the contract by signing a non-disclosure form, but they claim that such an agreement would be onerous and unnecessary. ( Mike Faher article in Vermont Digger Conservation Law Foundation details Vermont Yankee concerns.)

Transparency and soap

Guy Page, a frequent guest blogger at this blog, has been following the sale closely. Like me, Page cannot understand why CLF (a bunch of lawyers, after all) won't sign a non-disclosure in order to obtain more information about the sale. I will not attempt to equal Page's excellent commentary in Vermont Digger: Where most see opportunity, CLF sees only problems with VY sale.   However, I will quote him.

CLF’s knowledge of NorthStar’s plan is limited, due to its choice not to sign a non-disclosure statement protecting certain contract information. If CLF was truly concerned about transparency, it shouldn’t have soaped its side of the window.

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A side note about CLF Ventures

 Aside: I have never understood the relationship between the main CLF and their Ventures.  CLF is a not-for-profit 501c3, and they make their form 990 readily available. 501c3 organizations generally have educational or charitable purposes, which can include advocacy under the "educational" purpose.  

CLF Ventures seems to be a part of the main CLF, and it is described under the Our Focus section of the CLF website. Still, the work CLF does as "Ventures" seems pretty much like the work other law firms do for for-profit companies. For example, here is a quote from the CLF website: "CLF Ventures helps early stage companies gain access to the market through our unique blend of experience. We use private and public networks, our knowledge of the business, market, and regulatory arenas, and our understanding of key gatekeepers to help early stage companies access markets and generate revenues."

Helping companies "generate revenues"? Is this service also a part of the not-for-profit CLF 501c3?  I can't tell from their website: such services may be part of the main CLF, or not. The website doesn't make it easy to understand the relationship between the two (or maybe just one) entities, CLF and CLF Ventures. It is not transparent. End Aside. 

The Solar View from Vermont: The Gold Rush and the Panels.

Andrew Savage of All Earth Renewables
describes a Vermont solar installation
to Energy Safari class, 2011
Blog post on our visit   to the solar installation
Robert Hargraves blog post on our visit

The Solar Gold Rush

At VTDigger, Erin Mansfield wrote a two-part special report on solar. It is well worth reading.

Part 1: Tax breaks drive Vermont solar gold rush
Part 2: Rural communities push back against solar

The first part includes a summary of how solar developers make money: basically, they make money through tax credits.

The second part describes how some Vermont senators tried to give the local towns more say in solar siting. They did not succeed at empowering the towns.  It doesn't matter what the local people think: the Public Service Board rules on solar siting.

I also recommend the comments on these posts.

A Quote: 100,000 acres

When I came back from my trip to England, I discovered that Erin Mansfield had called me.  By the time I called her back, it was too late be quoted in her excellent report on the solar gold rush.

However, Mansfield had looked up my post The 90% Solution: What 90% Renewables would look like in Vermont.  She quoted that post, as follows:

The Ethan Allen Institute, a conservative think tank, estimates that Vermont would need to install panels on 100,000 acres of land to meet 90 percent of its electric energy needs through solar.

The quote is correct. However, this estimate is for the case in which Vermont meets ALL its energy needs through solar renewables, not just its current electric needs. (Meeting all energy needs from renewables is the scenario required by the Vermont Comprehensive Energy Plan.)  The Vermont mandate is for 90% renewables for everything: electricity, transportation, heat, industrial processes.

Currently, Vermont uses 6,000 GWh of electricity per year.  I estimated that if electricity was also needed for heat pumps and transportation, we would triple that usage.  We would use 18,000 GWh electricity per year. If we met that requirement with solar, we would need 100,000 acres of solar panels.

Let's say, though, that we only use solar for our current electricity usage. We use 6000 GWh of electricity, and would only (only!) need 33,000 acres of solar installations to generate that amount of energy with solar.  (FWIW: Green Mountain National Forest is approximately 400,000 acres.)

100,000 acres: Showing my work

My estimate of 100,000 acres of solar panels was based on a 2.2 MW solar installation in White River Junction. This installation uses 15 acres and is expected to make 2,800 MWh of electricity per year.  It's a quick calculation to get to 100,000 acres. With 18,000 GWh required, and 2.8 GWh produced per 15 acres--the panels would cover 96,000 acres to make 18,000 GWh.

I wrote that estimate in 2013. I decided to do an update with more recent solar installations. I found a Woodstock installation being planned: 500 kW on 3 acres, and a Strafford Hill installation being dedicated: 2000 kW (2 MW) on 15 acres. Quick calculations showed that the solar installations are taking up about the same acres/kWh as I used in my previous estimate, to the rough level of accuracy of the earlier estimate.

The panels are coming

I don't think Vermont will ever host 100,000 acres of solar panels.  I don't think we will even host 10,000 acres of panels: the costs would be outrageously high.  At some point, even clever financing doesn't work.

But as the Mansfield report describes: solar is booming in Vermont, whether local people like it or not.  The "black billboards" (real billboards are not legal in Vermont) are springing up everywhere. As Mansfield writes:

The number and proposed size of commercial projects is also shooting up. The Public Service Department is now reacting to a handful of 20-megawatt commercial projects — which are 10 times larger than any of the existing projects in Vermont.

In other words, the panels are coming.

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Apple tree

Aside: Oh, I can't resist.  Once in a while, the hypocrisy is so blatant that it is funny.

Today,  Green mogul opposed wind farm off Martha's Vineyard, blasts objectors in Vermont was published by Bruce Parker of Vermont Watchdog.  The article tells about a renewable energy developer who has a fifteen million dollar home on Martha's Vineyard. He objected to Cape Wind. He claimed that it would spoil his view and lower the value of his house.  However, this same developer is planning a solar farm near the home of Libby Harris in Vermont. He has dismissed her objections (in a filed brief) as “NIMBY concerns.”

If you read Parker's post, you will see why I included a picture of an apple tree.

Parker has several guests posts on this blog.  The most recent post was Vermont town  protests renewable energy credits for MA and CT.

End Aside.

Vermont and Climate Warming: Guest Post by Rob Roper

Camel's Hump

Time to Take Climate Change Debate to the Next Level

It is safe to say that all or at least most of us believe that Vermont is a very special place, and we all want to do what’s necessary to preserve and pass on this unique treasure that both draws and keeps us here – majestic mountains, pristine waters, and wild, open spaces. The question is, what is the best policy for doing so.

On April 14, the state Senate passed a resolution declaring:

That the Senate of the State of Vermont recognizes that climate change is real, that human activities make a substantive contribution to climate change, and that it is imperative Vermont take steps now to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels in order to promote energy independence and meet the State’s statutory goals for reduced greenhouse gas emissions. …

These statutory goals mean putting Vermont on a path toward getting 90 percent of our energy, including that for home heating and transportation, from renewable, preferably local sources by 2050. This sounds all well and good until one considers the cost, and we’re not talking about money. The policy of generating so much electricity from wind and solar plants will require developing thousands of acres of Vermont’s pristine landscape for industrial energy production. This will have profoundly negative effects on both the aesthetics and the ecology of the Green Mountain State.

It’s time to bring the climate change debate beyond whether or not the phenomenon exists (the useless quibbling between “deniers” and “alarmists”), and to start seriously discussing in concrete, realistic terms the costs and benefits of specific proposed policies. In other words, if we embark on transitioning to a largely renewable, locally produced energy portfolio, what will the net impact be on our ecosystem both in the short and long term.

Let’s assume for the moment that the most dire climate change predictions are true: human activity is a big factor, and temperatures could rise as much as 4 degrees by the end of the century.

It’s time to bring the climate change debate beyond whether or not the phenomenon exists (the useless quibbling between “deniers” and “alarmists”), and to start seriously discussing in concrete, realistic terms the costs and benefits of specific proposed policies.

So, if we develop all of Vermont’s usable ridge lines with industrial wind turbines, and develop thousands of acres of pasture land with industrial solar plants, will that have any impact on global climate trends either directly or indirectly? Will this effort and expense be relevant in preserving our own ski or maple sugaring industries, for example, over the next eight decades? Will it prevent the next Irene from happening? The honest answer to all these questions is no.

So, why are we doing this?

Some will argue that while Vermont’s efforts are by themselves futile, we should serve as an example to others. OK. But, then we have to ask how much of an influence would Vermont’s example have to impact global climate trends? If a couple of New England states follow us, would that make a difference? What about the East Coast? Or the entire United States? The honest answer is, even if the entire world did its best to follow Vermont, the impact by 2100 would be negligible to the point of unnoticeable. And, realistically, what are the odds China and India or even Texas are going to take a cue from Vermont any time soon?

We do know, however, that developing the kind of land intensive energy sources our current policy path calls for will negatively impact our ridgeline ecosystems through the construction of industrial wind turbines. Birds and bats will be killed, including endangered species. Thousands of acres of solar panels will disrupt animal habitats, ironically, making it harder for some species to adapt to climate change. And, of course, we will be sacrificing to a great extent the singular beauty of Vermont.

Is this really what we want to do?

A recent article in the New Yorker by environmental conservationist Jonathan Franzen, Carbon Capture: Has climate change made it harder for people to care about conservation, makes several interesting points on this topic, but this one sums it up neatly:

We can dam every river and blight every landscape with biofuel agriculture, solar farms, and wind turbines, to buy some extra years of moderated warming. Or we can settle for a shorter life of higher quality, protecting the areas where wild animals and plants are hanging on, at the cost of slightly hastening the human catastrophe.

Is it worth wiping out wildlife species, habitats, and landscapes today if the end result is an earth that is 3.9 degrees warmer a hundred years from now instead of four?

We can use our resources to make genuine progress in preserving our mountain tops, cleaning our lakes and waterways, maintaining open spaces, and saving our wildlife, or we can sacrifice all this to no real effect whatsoever. Plan A makes more sense.

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This guest post is by Rob Roper, President of the Ethan Allen Institute. Meredith Angwin heads the Energy Education Project of the Institute.

This post appeared in Vermont Digger on April 26, 2015, where it has a lively comment stream.

I also recommend my Earth Day post at the Northwest Clean Energy blog, which addresses similar concerns.

Why Electricity Costs Spiked in New England: My Op-ed

Why Are the Rates Rising?

A Valley News "Forum" letter writer was speaking for many recently when he asked about the huge electric rate increases this winter and the paltry explanations for them. David C. Montgomery of Hanover said his electricity bill had increased by 72 percent, even as petroleum products have dropped in cost. “All we have seen,’’ he wrote, “is a rather unconvincing claim about the need for more natural gas pipelines in New England and a series of what seem to be diversionary workshops on insulation.”

His letter states the problem succinctly. Oil prices are down. Gasoline prices are down to levels not seen for years. Natural gas prices are still low. “The need for more pipelines” does seem a rather weak claim, compared to the cheapness of the commodity carried in them. Also, why would we need more pipelines now, when we didn’t need them five years ago? The demand hasn’t changed that much.

The answer is that the grid itself has changed in our region. Power plants have been retired: Salem, Mt. Tom, Vermont Yankee. When coal and nuclear plants shut down, existing gas plants run longer and use more fuel, to make up for that power. More gas-fired plants are also being planned for the future.

More Gas Needed

Around 2000, about 15 percent of New England’s electricity was made by burning natural gas. Gas was expensive, and used only during times of peak demand. The rest of the time, electricity was supplied by a mixture of coal, nuclear, oil and hydro. Back then, with only 15 percent of electricity coming from natural gas, pipelines to the Northeast were adequate.

Now, the price of natural gas has fallen, and nearly half of our electricity demand is met with the newly inexpensive natural gas. With increased demand, the pipelines are no longer adequate. Particularly during very cold weather, when homes use more natural gas for heating, there isn’t enough available for power plants.

Last year, when temperatures plummeted and natural gas ran short, power plants burned oil, diesel and even jet fuel. The price on the grid went up as utilities bought power produced with more-expensive fuels. Last year, bulk electricity prices often soared past 40 cents per kWh (kilowatt hour) during times of high demand. (It’s usually 3 to 8 cents per kWh.) You can track realtime prices on the grid operator site (ISO-NE) on the Web.

Other costs also go up when power plants retire, but these aren’t so easy to track. For example, capacity payments go up. So far, I have described prices for kWh . . . that is, for power produced. There’s also something called a “capacity payment”: a payment for a plant to be available to produce power. The capacity payment auction takes place three years in advance. In 2013, the auction yielded $1 billion for power plant operators. Then a number of plants retired. With more scarcity, the 2014 auction brought $3 billion to plant operators. These billions are not as visible as the “price on the grid,” but the money comes from ratepayers and raises everyone’s cost of electricity.

Montreal Snow
from Wikipedia

Winter Reliability

Then there’s the reliability issue. The grid operator will do whatever it must to ensure reliability. For the past two winters, our grid operator has run “winter reliability programs” and frankly, that program saved us last winter. Last winter, the operator paid about $70 million to power plants that could burn oil. The plants used this money to stock up — with a supply on site, they had fuel available when they were called upon. Indeed, when gas-fired plants could not get gas, the oil-burning plants went online.

Last year, the Winter Reliability Program cost $70 million in the Northeast. This year, it is budgeted at $80 million. These multimillion dollar programs get translated into our winter power bills and winter price rises. However, there is a bit of hope for the future. This has been a milder winter, with low oil prices. To date, the grid’s Winter Reliability Program has spent far less than last winter, and that is a hopeful sign for the future.

Renewables

What about renewables? I will not focus much on renewables or their costs, because they are a very small portion of the electricity supply. I have been watching the hourly fuel supply on the grid rather closely, and wind has never been more than 2 percent of the supply. Renewables, including biomass and refuse, are about 6 percent of the supply. Renewables are not the cost-drivers on the grid.

Solutions, Maybe

I’ve explained the reasons for recent price rises, but do I have a solution? Well, a partial solution, maybe. First, I believe in conservation, and I just invested a great deal in improved insulation for my house. (And I want to thank Efficiency Vermont for picking up part of the cost.) To me, workshops on insulation are not merely diversionary. They are terribly important.

Being in favor of insulation is about as controversial as favoring real maple syrup. My second point is a little more controversial. Supposedly, we need more pipelines because gas is the fuel of choice . . . now. It’s abundant and cheap. But I don’t think it will remain cheap. Should we be building more pipelines because of low-priced gas? I am not sure. If the price of gas goes up, the pipelines will not be fully used.

Pipeline Pig Launcher
Wikipedia

Instead of more pipelines, I think we need a diversified grid. If we choose, we can build more renewables with a diversified grid, just as we can build them with a mostly-gas grid. And with a diversified grid (yes, I mean keeping our nuclear, coal, oil, Hydro-Quebec power as well as gas), we won’t have all our eggs in one basket.

If we are going to have a heavily natural-gas grid, we could keep our costs more stable (for now) and our grid more reliable by building more gas pipelines. But I think it would be better to choose conservation and grid diversity. With that, perhaps we could have reliability and prevent further drastic price rises in the future.

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Meredith Angwin of Wilder is a physical chemist who worked for electric utilities for more than 25 years and now heads the Energy Education Project of the Ethan Allen Institute.

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This op-ed appeared in the Valley News Sunday, January 18, 2015. I have edited it slightly (such as explaining that "Forum" is the Valley News letters section.)

It was illustrated with a very nice picture of Vermont Yankee.  The op-ed has appeared other places, also, including Vermont Digger, where it began to have a lively comment stream, but then a well-known anti-nuclear activist took over the comments.

I don't think it is worth duking it out with trolls, especially after they insult me.  For example, this line: Ms. Angwin still fails to acknowledge, however, that her basic premise is simply false: it is simply not a “fact that electricity prices are soaring all over the region.”  

In cheerier news about this op-ed, Don Kreis wrote a letter to the Valley News about my op-ed. Kreis is a former professor at Vermont Law School and a hearing officer with the Vermont Public Service Board. (His letter is not on the web, so I can't link to it.)  I am proud to quote the first sentence of Kreis's letter:

Meredith Angwin of the Ethan Allen Institute is a rock star among energy analysts, and she hits the right chord by blaming the recent run-up in electric rates on our big regional embrace of natural gas as a generation fuel.

Why Electric Rates Are Rising: My Op-ed

Reddy Kilowatt
From Wikipedia

New England electricity is too dependent upon natural gas-fired power plants. And we are about to pay a lot for that dependence.

In recent days, several New England utilities have announced major price rises for electricity. In Massachusetts, National Grid said that its customers can expect a 37 percent rate increase in November. Liberty Utilities in New Hampshire announced that there will be a 50 percent rate increase, and Unitil, which serves Massachusetts, Maine and New Hampshire, announced a price rise that will add over $40 a month to the average home electricity bill. These companies explained that the rate increases are due to the increasing cost of power on the grid.

Why is the grid cost increasing? Part of the reason is supply and demand. Supply has decreased. Vermont Yankee (nuclear) and Salem Harbor in Massachusetts (coal) are shutting down and will not be available this winter. During the high demand resulting from the polar vortex in early 2014, New England needed about 20,000 megawatts of power. The grid barely scraped up enough to meet the demand. This year, 1,000 megawatts, or five percent of that power, is going off-line, and no new power plants have been built.

But perhaps a bigger problem is that the New England grid is far too dependent on natural gas. During the polar vortex cold snap, which affected all of New England, many natural gas power plants could not get enough gas to operate. It was being used to heat homes. New England is often described as “pipeline-constrained”: There are not enough pipelines for the natural gas we need.

The grid operator, ISO-NE, a nonprofit company, is responsible for ensuring a reliable electric supply on the New England grid. The way the grid operates is that some plants keep running steadily all the time. The steady-operation plants are nuclear, coal and some of the natural gas facilities — basically, plants that operate on a steam cycle. When demand is higher than these plants can supply, it is met by putting more gas-fired plants into service. However, last winter, many gas-fired plants could not operate.

ISO-NE foresaw this natural gas supply crunch and had a “winter reliability” program in place. It paid $70 million to oil-burning power plants to keep oil available to burn. This was a “capacity” payment. That is, the plants were paid just to have oil on hand. (This payment also increased our electric bills.) But during the polar vortex power crunch, the oil was not enough, and some jet fuel was also burned to make power. In other words, over-dependence on natural gas led to expensive alternatives: oil and jet fuel. Using these fuels caused major price increases.

Also, even without the crunch, the price of natural gas itself has doubled since its low point in 2012.

The two issues (supply and diversity of fuel sources) are going to intersect again this winter. With two power plants closed, a cold snap this winter will require more oil and jet fuel than was required last winter. Utilities are getting their rate increases lined up to deal with the coming price spike.

What about my own local utility? I live in Vermont, and Green Mountain Power (GMP) told the press recently that because of its “efficiencies” it has lowered prices and will keep them low.

I do not believe prices will stay low in Vermont. GMP is subject to the same factors that affect the other utilities. It buys much of its power on the same markets. GMP also has large contracts with Hydro Quebec. Unfortunately, these are “market-follow” contracts. When the market price rises on the grid, Hydro Quebec will also raise the price that it charges GMP. Back in 2010, I wrote blog posts on how the new market-follow contracts were “a bad deal with Hydro Quebec.” This winter, I suspect we will find out just how bad a deal they are.

What about renewables? For many reasons, renewable build-out is not happening very quickly. As of last year, less than 10 percent of Vermont’s in-state electricity generation was by renewables, not counting hydro.

Also, renewables are generally paired with natural gas (gas-fired plants are turned on when the wind dies down or the sun sets). So renewables are not going to be much help right now.

I was recently elected to be on the coordinating committee of the Consumer Liaison Group of ISO-NE. Along with 120 people from all over the Northeast, I attended its quarterly meeting in September. Everyone there seemed to have a tale of when the big price rises would hit their local utilities. Many are planning major price increases in January 2015.

What shall we do about these price spikes? Just as in our private lives, diversity is important. I think we need to be willing to accept diversity on the grid: nuclear plants and coal plants. Natural gas is an excellent fuel, but it seems to be the one and only fuel acceptable to many people. However, what is happening on the grid right now is a classic illustration of the old saying: “Don’t put all your eggs in one basket.” Our grid is close to just one basket right now (over 50 percent natural gas). The winter is coming, and power will be expensive if any eggs drop.
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Meredith Angwin of Wilder is a physical chemist who worked for electric utilities for more than 25 years and now heads the Energy Education Project of the Ethan Allen Institute.

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This op-ed was published on Oct 12, 2014 in the Valley News. Valley News artist Shawn Bradley provided a clever graphic of Reddy Kilowatt flipping a switch to raise rates.  In honor of that graphic, I included a classic Reddy Kilowatt graphic on this post.

The op-ed was also published on the Vermont Digger website on October 21. The article has quite a lively comment stream.

No New Transmission Lines for Vermont! Vermont Government Reacts to Vermont Yankee Closing

Update: Governor Shumlin Reverses Position Again

In mid-June, Governor Shumlin spoke with utility regulators and "tapped the brakes" on the idea of a rapid build-out of gas pipelines and electric transmission lines. According to an article by John Herrick in Vermont Digger, Shumlin said this infrastructure might become obsolete, and new technologies could lessen the need to transmit large amounts of power.

However, in late June, Shumlin reversed his position. On June 20, a panel of energy experts representing the governors of all the New England states met: the meeting was reported by Deborah McDermott of Seacoast Online.  In this meeting, the panelists agreed to ask for a "tariff" (tax) on electricity. The tariff would be used to finance natural gas pipelines and electricity transmission lines.

The state-appointed panelists stepped on the gas for an infrastructure buildout.

As the energy panelists said--something has to give in New England.

It Was Winter 

Once upon a time (earlier this year, actually) a polar vortex came to call in New England.  Sub-zero temperatures  meant that great quantities of natural gas were used for heating homes. Therefore, not enough natural gas was available for gas-fired power plants.  Oil and jet fuel were called into service to provide electricity, and prices on the grid soared. As many news reports noted at the time, there are not enough natural gas pipelines into the Northeast.

Governor Shumlin in January: We need new energy projects

On January 21, all six governors of New England got together as part of the New England States Committee on Electricity to address the pipeline problem.  The governors signed an agreement requesting ISO-NE to support in the development and filing of any tariff changes [fees to users] for two purposes.

In the first purpose, these fees would enable new transmission lines to be built. The lines would bring between 1200 and 3600 MW of low carbon power into the New England electrical systems.  Translation: we will build new power lines to get electricity from Hydro Quebec.

In the second purpose, governors also requested a fee on electricity for the purpose of building new pipeline capacity  to bring natural gas to the area.  The idea is that consumers should pay more for electricity now, in order to build gas pipelines as soon as possible.

Note: Governor Shumlin signed this agreement with these requests.

And Now It's Summer

Meanwhile, the seasons have changed. Peonies bloom, fireflies blink in the twilight, and Vermonters protest energy projects. Pipeline opponents are concerned that an already-planned gas pipeline will carry fracked gas. They also worry about water contamination. They are protesting, chaining themselves to the doors of the gas company, and so forth. One protester was arrested for alleged assault.

Fireflies in Germany

People in Vermont do not like this pipeline. Their reaction doesn't look good for building even more pipelines in Vermont.

But what about transmission lines?  This situation is more confusing because several lines have been proposed. John Herrick of Vermont Digger wrote a comprehensive report in early June: Vermont Smack in the Middle of Crucial Electricity Supply and Demand. As you can see in the report, Vermont seems to be in favor of at least some of these transmission lines, as long as enough goodies are attached. A quote from the Herrick report:

[TDI] wants to bury a 150-mile transmission line under Lake Champlain. TDI, a subsidiary of Blackstone Group, a financial services firm, has lined up private capital for the estimated $1.2 billion project.....TDI says it would also donate tens of millions of dollars to the state for costly Lake Champlain cleanup – or whatever the state decides is best.

Gee, that sounds familiar. "Donate tens of millions of dollars..."

Governor Shumlin in June: Let's Slow Down the Infrastructure Build-Out

As reported by John Herrick in Vermont Digger, Governor Shumlin spoke to utility regulators in early June.  Shumlin "tapped the brakes" on the build-out.  He said that we don't know that "with the evolutions of technology and the local, distributed generation of power...(we may end up) paying for huge stranded costs if we build tons and tons of delivery." Shumlin spoke of the evolution of cell phones. In parallel with cell phones, Shumlin claimed that "new technologies could soon lessen the need to transmit large amounts of power from faraway areas."

Brayton Point

Well, not really. Let's look at the power situation in the Northeast. In Vermont, Vermont Yankee is shutting down.  In Massachusetts, three major coal plants (Salem Harbor, Brayton Point, and Mt. Tom) will close in the next few years, some in the next few months.The grid operator said that Brayton Point was a "must-run" facility. The plant owners answered: "Too bad, we are closing it anyway in 2017."

In short, without "power from faraway areas," the grid around here could get seriously unreliable. We will need transmission lines.

Dumb? Or Smart?

Some of my friends have looked at the Governor's statement and concluded that the man is simply dumb about energy.  He doesn't want power plants, and he doesn't want transmission lines. Yes, this is the man who said that Germany  got 30% of its juice from solar, and that a nuclear plant must be kept running with mostly full staff for years after shutdown.

Shumlin has proven that he is no genius on energy matters.

Governor Shumlin

However, Shumlin is very smart about politics and negotiations.  His recent statements can best be understood as part of a negotiation with anyone who would build any infrastructure in Vermont.  If you build it, you must pay us!

Shumlin has surely noticed that without Vermont Yankee, there will be no easy source for new funds in the Clean Energy Development Fund. I think he has decided to tax the new infrastructure: in other word, tax whatever replaces Vermont Yankee.

When Shumlin makes a speech against the infrastructure development, he becomes better able to get concessions (money) from the infrastructure developers. Shumlin has shown that he can be a formidable enemy to an energy project.  As one person on Facebook wrote: "He's got Vermont Yankee's head on his wall now."  If a project doesn't want him as an enemy, the project owners will probably pay what he wants them to pay.

In my opinion, Shumlin is not dumb. He's smart like a fox.

As a blogger, I plan to have the last word here:

Foxes are smart for themselves.  They are not known for their public-spirited actions.  Ultimately, the ratepayers will bear the costs of Shumlin's way of being-smart.

Decommissioning, Governor Shumlin, and Dry Cask Storage

Did I Write "Patronizing Bunk"?

I wrote an op-ed about the state's agreement with Entergy about decommissioning. I published it on this blog, and it was also published on Vermont Digger. On Vermont Digger, the title was Entergy Settlement Before the PSB is Good for the State. It had a lively comment stream on Vermont Digger.

Governor Peter Shumlin

In this op-ed I wrote:

However, in the course of the negotiations, I suspect the state learned some facts about  decommissioning.

Two anti-nuclear commentators called my statement: "patronizing bunk." They claimed that the state was well-versed in decommissioning from the start.  The state didn't have to learn anything.

Well, I begged to differ.

Here is part of the answer I posted, with slight edits.

About Patronizing

I was not simply being patronizing. When I wrote: “the state learned something about decommissioning,” you thought I was referring to the DPS (Department of Public Service). Actually, I was referring to Governor Shumlin. I was not clear, which was my fault. But then again, I tend to use locutions like “the state” to avoid finger-pointing at individuals.

Perhaps, instead of being vaguely snarky, I should be more direct, even if it turns out a bit more pointed at one man. Frankly, this would have been uncomfortable for me to write originally, but I am writing it to show what I was thinking about.

Below, I have written something more accurate, more pointed, and with references. Perhaps I should have written the material below, instead.

About Governor Shumlin

What I should have written:

And, it looks like over the years, Governor Shumlin himself is learning something about decommissioning. Here’s one of his press conferences from 2011:

http://vtdigger.org/2011/03/03/govs-presser-on-video-shumlin-praises-school-boards-rails-at-gop-and-entergy/

The title includes SHUMLIN SAYS SAFSTOR WASN’T PART OF DEAL WITH ENTERGY. The article includes Governor Shumlin arguing with reporters who quote the MOU at him. It’s kind of funny, if it weren’t sad.

From the same press conference, but this time a direct quote from Shumlin:

http://truenorthreports.com/shumlin-talks-about-uvm-vermont-yankee-and-taxes

“The jobs gap doesn’t really happen for about 16 years,” he said. “Five to six years for the plant to cool down, gotta keep all the systems running, that requires a number of employees, several hundred. And ten years of decommissioning. So the jobs cliff, despite what they tell you in those 30 second advertisements, is not as significant as long as they keep their promise on decommissioning the plant whenever it shuts down.”

The Governor is Learning

Recently, the Governor has had to eat his words and acknowledge SAFSTOR is allowed. He has had to acknowledge that the plant will not keep running for five or six years with several hundred employees. It is nobody’s fault but his own that he said these absurd things at a press conference. Nobody forced him to make such a fool of himself.

You gotta give the man credit, though, Shumlin is learning. Maybe the learning didn’t happen at the negotiations, maybe it did. Maybe it happened before. I should not have said “when” it happened, because I don’t know. But he’s gone from myth-based “hundreds of people for five-six years” to “everything will be in dry casks within seven years.” He has more of a grasp of reality now. I don’t know and should not have said exactly when he learned these things. But he is learning.

I want to say something though about his advisers. Where were they? Surely someone could have told him the facts of life about the M O U and what happens during decommissioning. Apparently, nobody did. People just let him go out there and say a bunch of things that simply are not true. He is learning, for sure. Are his advisers learning?"

Updated: The Dry Casks.  Vermont Digger Special Report on Decommissioning

I wrote a draft of this a few days ago, but I didn't post it because I was busy with our daughter's book launch.

Yesterday, Vermont Digger published a special report on remaining areas of disagreement between Vermont Yankee and the state agencies in Vermont.  John Herrick wrote Despite Recent Agreement, State and Entergy Remain at Odds Over Funding for Dismantling Vermont Yankee. 

According to this article, the state is concerned that Entergy may use decommissioning funds to move used fuel from the fuel pool to dry casks.  Attorney General Sorrell says that If Entergy elects to remove money from the fund, Sorrell said the state will take legal action.  Mr. Sorrell apparently thinks that moving fuel  to dry casks is not part of decommissioning: the state wants the decommissioning fund reserved for "tearing down the plant."

Umm...last I looked, only the NRC could say what a decommissioning fund can or cannot be used for.

Sigh. I thought the state had learned that the federal government, not the state, is responsible for regulating decommissioning and nuclear safety.  Oh well.  

Maybe they are not learning as fast as I thought they were learning.

Defending SAFSTOR planning at Vermont Yankee

The post and the objection

In a recent op-ed, I wrote that the proposed Entergy-Vermont settlement is good for Vermont. Here's the post on this blog

http://yesvy.blogspot.com/2014/02/the-proposed-entergy-settlement-is-good.html#.UwnmFSiyTAY

and here's the post as it appeared on the local news site, Vermont Digger

http://vtdigger.org/2014/02/11/meredith-angwin-entergy-settlement-psb-good-state/

There's a lively comment stream on the Vermont Digger post, with several comments objecting to my description of the plans for decommissioning.  Here's what I said in my op-ed:

You can’t begin tearing down the building while the fuel pool is still in use. So there has to be at least a five-year delay between plant closing and the beginning of major decommissioning work. Therefore, there will be a gap of several years in the economic activity around the plant.

Some comments basically  said: "I am not a nuclear engineer, but they can start decommissioning sooner."  I encourage you to read the comments themselves. I have my answer to these comments below. I have added subheadings (in bold) that weren't in my original answer.  Hopefully, these subheadings add to readability.

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My answer to the objection

You say you are “NOT commenting on how or when decommissioning needs to be done” yet you seem to think it can begin immediately, despite the requirements of the operating fuel pool. Sounds like you actually ARE commenting on how and when decommissioning can be done.

You give the impression that if Entergy doesn’t start decommissioning areas other than the fuel pool immediately, Entergy is stalling. Actually, this is not the case, in my opinion. In general, the nuclear industry is very conservative about decommissioning. You might think: Hey, they can always start by tearing down the office building, no big deal. Actually, the industry shows itself quite reluctant to begin big deconstruction/decommissioning projects in close proximity to active nuclear plants (or actively maintained fuel pools that can’t be isolated easily). This is basically a safety precaution.

SAFSTOR for Safety

Indian Point

For example, Indian Point 1 ceased operation in 1974. It is in close proximity to the operating plants Indian Point 2 and 3. Indian Point 1 is in SAFSTOR, which is safer than attempting to tear it down while it shares the same area with active plants. Similarly, Dresden 1 was shut down in 1978, and is right next to Dresden 2 and 3. Millstone 1 ceased operations in 1998, and is close to the operating plants, Millstone 2 and 3. Dresden 1 and Millstone 1, like Indian Point 1, are also in SAFSTOR.

Considering the position of the fuel pool at Vermont Yankee, I would expect the owners to do nothing on site (except perhaps move some of the fuel to dry casks) while that fuel pool needs to be maintained. That’s the conservative way. I frankly have no particular opinion on when they move some of the fuel from the fuel pool. They can’t finish moving the fuel out of the pool for five years, and nothing much else can happen on site while the fuel pool is in active service.

Or rather, in my opinion, nothing much SHOULD happen on site while the fuel pool is in active service. Similarly, I think it would be a bad idea to decommission Dresden 1 while still operating Dresden 2 and 3 right next door.

Maine Yankee

No doubt, someone is going to say: “They dismantled Maine Yankee quickly! So what’s the problem here?” Well, Maine Yankee was a PWR with the fuel pool in the basement of a building that was comparatively easy to isolate. Vermont Yankee is a BWR with the fuel pool in a position that is not easy to isolate.

Waiting five years to begin serious decommissioning is the safest and most conservative way to proceed with the Vermont Yankee plant, and this has nothing to do with money.

Workforce issues and the nuclear opponents desire to feel good about themselves

About the workforce. Alas, decommissioning rarely uses very many members of the original workforce. The decommissioning jobs include chemical cleaning and deconstruction. These are not the same skills as running the plant. As others have noted, for decommissioning, teams of contractors with either specialized skills (chemical cleaning) or moderate skills in the building trades (deconstruction) do the jobs. In many cases, a decommissioning contractor is hired by the utility, and that contractor hires the teams. EnergySolutions is one such company, but there are others.

The people at the plant will be laid off, and there will be few of them involved in decommissioning. That is what has happened at other plants also. The opponents of Vermont Yankee do not want to admit this, because otherwise (conceivably) they would feel guilty about causing their neighbors to lose their jobs. But all their sweet sayings about “hoping the good people at VY will continue to work” doesn’t change reality. Decommissioning is almost completely done by teams of outsiders, no matter when decommissioning is done, early or late. That is just the way it is.

More reading

I have more explanations and some links in this blog post, including some workforce analysis from the Maine Yankee experience. I have written other blog posts on the subject also: you can search my blog for “decommissioning” in the little keyword box at the upper left.

http://yesvy.blogspot.com/2011/11/decommissioning-facts-versus-fantasy.html#.UwtoCRZ5ufQ

The Proposed Entergy Settlement is Good for Vermont

The Proposed Settlement

The state of Vermont and Entergy Corporation have been battling each other for years, but the two parties reached an agreement in December about the future of Vermont Yankee. Entergy has owned and operated the 42-year-old nuclear plant in Vernon since 2002. When Entergy announced plans to close the plant by December 2014, the state, which has passed laws aimed at preventing the plant from operating, seemed surprised. It also lost some negotiating leverage. Even so, the settlement, which the Vermont Public Service Board must still approve, is a good deal for Vermont — better than I thought possible. Let’s take a look its four main points: the Certificate of Public Good; pending lawsuits; payments; and decommissioning.

The Certificate of Public Good: In 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission renewed Vermont Yankee’s federal license for 20-year-period, through 2032. However, to keep operating for that period, the plant also needed state approval, specifically a Certificate of Public Good from the Public Service Board. The Shumlin administration vigorously opposed granting such a certificate, and used the state approval process to try to force the plant to shut down when its original license expired. Now that Entergy has amended its petition to operate only through the end of this year, not through 2032, the state will be on Entergy’s side before the Public Service Board.

Lawsuits: The main federal lawsuit hinged on whether Vermont interfered in the federal regulation of nuclear safety. In both district court and in appeals court, Entergy won its case, arguing that the Legislature attempted to regulate nuclear safety when the state Senate voted in 2010 to deny the plant a certificate of public good. Nuclear safety, like airline safety and drug safety, is regulated at the federal level. Though Entergy won its case, both Vermont and Entergy conceivably had grounds to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. Now, according to the agreement, neither side will appeal. I suspect both sides breathed a sigh of relief.

The agreement also settled another lawsuit about a new “generation tax.” The state had raised the generation tax on Vermont Yankee to $12 million a year. This is a tax paid by Entergy for every kilowatt-hour that the plant generates. However, the higher tax rate applied only to power plants that were built after 1965 and were larger than 200 megawatts! Of course, there’s only one such plant in the state, and Entergy quite reasonably felt targeted. In the agreement, Entergy agreed to drop this suit and to pay the $12 million for 2014.

Payments: Entergy agreed to pay more than the new generation tax. In 2015, the plant won’t be generating any power, so Entergy won’t be required to pay the generation tax. However, Entergy agreed to pay the state $5 million in 2015, to help the state as it deals with the loss tax revenue Vermont Yankee generated. Entergy also agreed to other relatively short-term payments: a payment of $5 million to the Clean Energy Development Fund, and a further payment of $2 million a year for five years to help Windham County adapt to the plant closing.

In his address on the state budget, Gov. Peter Shumlin mentioned “one-time payments” from Entergy as part of his plan to close the state’s budget gap.

The state appears to have won the financial negotiations. However, the plant closing means that $60 million a year in payroll will disappear from the local economy. These payments hardly begin to close that gap for Vermont and neighboring states. As I have said before, it would have been far better if the plant remained open. Some people say that decommissioning will be a similar boost to the local economy, but it won’t be. Not in the next few years at least.

Decommissioning: This has been, and remains, the most difficult and contentious part of the agreement. When Entergy bought the plant in 2002, the agreement it signed with the state allows Entergy to use a delayed decommissioning plan called SAFSTOR, approved by the NRC. With
SAFSTOR, decommissioning can take up to 60 years but it could also be completed sooner. The state wanted to decommission the plant sooner, much sooner  —  immediately, as a matter of fact.

However, in the course of the negotiations, I suspect the state learned some facts about decommissioning. Decommissioning cannot start for six or more years after the plant is closed. After the plant is shut down, the last fuel from the reactor is placed in a spent-fuel pool. This fuel must cool in the pool for five years before it can be removed and put into dry-cask storage. In plants such as Vermont Yankee, the fuel pool is in the same building as the reactor.

You can’t begin tearing down the building while the fuel pool is still in use. So there has to be at least a five-year delay between plant closing and the beginning of major decommissioning work. Therefore, there will be a gap of several years in the economic activity around the plant. In the agreement, Entergy agreed to move the fuel from the pool in a timely fashion. In the press conference about the recent agreement, Shumlin said that all fuel bundles should probably be moved into dry cask storage within about seven years.

Maine Yankee dry cask storage

Other major decommissioning work can begin after the fuel is moved to dry casks. The decommissioning fund is around $580 million now, and decommissioning is estimated to cost between $600 million and $1 billion. Entergy agreed to start full decommissioning when the fund is large enough to to pay for the job. (Federal rules for SAFSTOR stipulate that owners can wait up to 60 years to complete decommissioning, no matter how big the fund.) Entergy also agreed to put $25 million into a separate fund for “greenfielding” the site. Greenfielding generally involves excavating, grading and seeding.

The Next Steps

Of course, not everyone is happy with the agreement. Opponents loudly insist that decommissioning must start immediately (it can’t), and others worry that it will take years for Entergy to have enough funds to start decommissioning. The definition of “greenfielding” is also contentious.

Even so, the agreement is a major step forward in what has been a hard battle between Vermont Yankee and the state. Both are arguing in favor of this agreement before the Public Service Board. That’s quite an unexpected development. Either side could withdraw from this agreement if the Public Service Board does not approve it by March 31, however. The board is now considering this plan, and the public comment period is still open. At the PSB website, you can read docket 7862 and write your comments. I encourage you to do so.

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Here is a direct link to the comment form on this docket.

http://psb.vermont.gov/docketsandprojects/public-comment?docket=7862

When reading docket 7862, you will note that there are two major document filings: the Memorandum of Understanding and the Settlement Agreement.  The Settlement Agreement is the agreement between Entergy and the state agencies, while the Memorandum of Understanding is the part of the Settlement Agreement that lies within the jurisdiction of the Public Service Board. The Board will rule on the Memorandum, but the Settlement Agreement was filed for informational purposes.


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The article above is an op-ed that I wrote (plus a short end section on links).

The op-ed has been published in the Valley News, True North Reports, and Vermont Digger.  It may also be published other places in Vermont. 

Legislators visit Vernon and are shocked to find economic pain.

Quotes and Comments

On Monday, October 28, two legislative committees went to the Vernon Elementary School to listen to local companies and residents discuss the next steps after Vermont Yankee closes.  They had an afternoon session in which business groups addressed them and an evening session open to public comments.  The two committees were the Natural Resources and Energy Committee, and the Commerce and Economic Development Committee.

On the Save Vermont Yankee Facebook page, I have seen this visit described as a "dog and pony show"  and that the legislators "couldn't care less."  Other comments were less flattering.

So I thought I would devote this blog post to quotes from the newspaper articles about the meeting, along with some commentary about the quotes.

Where the Money Comes From

In the afternoon meeting,  the various business groups presented their issues and questions. This meeting was reported by Terri Hallenbeck of the Burlington Free Press. Windham County asks state for help as VY prepares to shut down.

A quote from that article:

Meanwhile, the Legislature should be wary of forcing Entergy to pay more taxes and fees without knowing where that money is coming from, Tom Buchanan, chairman of the Windham Regional Commission’s Vermont Yankee Study Committee.

There is a risk if lawmakers levy a new tax on Vermont Yankee to pay for spent fuel, for example, that that money could come from the plant’s decommissioning fund, he said. That would simply slow the decommissioning process, he said.

Blogger comment: Very true.  Later in the article, Mike Twomey of Entergy explains some of the things for which the decommissioning money can be used.

In my opinion, the legislature saw Vermont Yankee as the ultimate cash-cow (Money for the Clean Energy Development Fund. Town of Vernon shares property taxes with the state, etc.).  Perhaps as the plant closes, the legislature will come to their senses and recognize that their golden goose is leaving town.

This issue reminds me of the time when Entergy first filed a federal lawsuit against Vermont.  Shumlin immediately arranged for the legislature to pass a law that Vermont Yankee would pay for the state's costs in defending against that lawsuit!  The law was never enforced (Attorney General of Vermont Acknowledges "Shaky Concept" in Charging Entergy for Vermont's Expenses) but it gives an idea of the legislature's ideas on what they think they can do---just by  passing a law.

The Legislature Has Responsibility

Andrew Stein at Vermont Digger wrote Windham County Seeks $2.2 Million in State Aid to Recover from Vermont Yankee closing.  A quote from that article:

Martin Langeveld, a Vernon resident, told the legislators that they should feel responsible for mitigating the impact of Vermont Yankee’s closure.

“In this situation, the governor and the Legislature did the exact opposite of what you usually do,” he said. “Instead of trying to preserve jobs, instead of trying to attract and support a large employer, they actively sought to close one down. That is unique. That is what makes this one different.

“I suggest you need to consider what the Legislature’s responsibility is now that it has gained that objective it sought for so long,” Langeveld said. “In this case, you have a special responsibility to permit a mitigation effort to go forward and to generously fund that mitigation effort.”

Blogger comment: Langeveld said it well.

Tony Klein Notices Real People

Susan Smallheer at Times Argus wrote State Catches Heat for Vermont Yankee Closing.  The final two paragraphs of that article:

Rep. Tony Klein

Rep. Tony Klein, chairman of the House Natural Resources and Energy Committee, and a leading Yankee opponent, told the gathering he had a “greater appreciation of what’s going on down here. That’s a big accomplishment.”

“You’re not just a nondescript face any more,” he said. “We have heard it first-hand and we have a greater appreciation of what needs to happen.”

Blogger comment: Oh puh-leeze. Klein has been a determined foe of Vermont Yankee.  I have heard him say that the presence of Vermont Yankee could destroy the Vermont "brand." (On the other hand, Klein is a great supporter of wind turbines.)

Around the time of the famous vote in the Senate (2010), many people from Vermont Yankee came up to talk to the legislators.  They reported that the legislators avoided them, ran into the committee rooms to hide, wouldn't look the plant employees in the eye, etc.  I did not blog about this because I didn't know which legislators did what.  I try for accuracy on this blog.  Sometime I think I try too hard for too much accuracy.

Well, for Tony Klein, I think it IS a "big accomplishment" that the people of Vernon are not "nondescript face(s)."  People in the nuclear industry should be grateful for whatever progress we make with anti-nuclear committee leaders. Right?

Okay.  Time to end this post. I'm getting snarky...

A State of Extortion: Conditions for a Vermont Yankee Certificate

John McClaughry
at a dinner in his honor

The Prediction: John McClaughry

Shortly after Entergy announced it would close Vermont Yankee in 2014, Governor Peter Shumlin decided that people should work together, not fight with each other.  Specifically, Shumlin said that his administration would “use this opportunity to build better relations with Entergy.”

John McClaughry doubted that statement.  McClaughry is one of the founders of the Ethan Allen Institute, and he predicted that better relations between Entergy and Shumlin were not going to happen.  Better relations weren't in the cards (to use a fortune-teller analogy).   Governor Shumlin would continue to behave the way Governor Shumlin behaves.  

In early September, a few days after Shumlin's announcement, McClaughry wrote an op-ed which was published many places in Vermont:  Governor Shumlin's Unlikely Olive Branch to Entergy. Here's the quote with the prediction:

With this long, outspoken, and unbroken record of opposition to the nuclear plant and its corporate owner, can we expect Peter Shumlin to now seek “better relations” with Entergy? It’s far more likely that he, his regulators and lawyers, and his legislative friends will spend the rest of his time in the Governor’s office extorting every last dime out of Entergy to fund their own pet projects, and when that is pushed as far as it can go, forcing Entergy to spend as much as possible through more of the “cumulative regulation” that Entergy says contributed to its decision to close the plant.

The Pondering: State Weighs Conditions for Entergy

When Entergy announced it was closing the plant, the state "weighed the conditions" they would put

Commissioner Recchia
from DPS site

on Vermont Yankee's continued operation for a final year. 

The Public Service Board was still considering a Certificate of Public Good (CPG) for Vermont Yankee when Entergy announced it was closing the plant.  Entergy quickly filed an amended petition with the Board, asking for a CPG for through the end of 2014, instead of through 2032.  Under Shumlin's administration, the Department of Public Service (DPS) had opposed the 20-year extension.  Would they also oppose a one-year extension? 

When Entergy filed for a one-year extension,  Chris Recchia, commissioner of the department, said the department was considering its options about the one-year extension. Here's a quote from Andrew Stein's article in Vermont Digger. 

“The options are to support it (the one-year certificate) with conditions or oppose it unless there are conditions,” he (Recchia) said.

The Prediction Fulfilled: Also Known As The Shake-Down

First, we have to admit that the state learned some very expensive lessons in various courts.  The DPS considered recommending a time-table for decommissioning, or recommending how the plant should handle spent fuel.  But then they thought better of it. Recchia noted that these areas fall under the purview of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  

“We felt we needed to focus on areas where we have jurisdiction,” Recchia said.  (From Oct 25 article Terri Hallenbeck in the Burlington Free Press.)

If DPS tried to regulate safety, they could lose in court. Gathering money from Entergy seemed a more reasonable tactic.  DPS recommended that the Public Service Board should extract money from the plant in return for a fourteen month CPG.  Specfically, DPS recommend that Entergy must

• Put $60 million dollars in a separate trust fund for decommissioning within 21 days of receiving a certificate of public good from the state (Anne Galloway article in Vermont Digger)
• Put $4.65 million dollars into a fund "for the state to disburse" for dislocated worker assistance (Terri Hallenbeck  article). 

Another justification given for Entergy contributing $4.65 million to the state is that the state will lose its "generation tax" revenues when Vermont Yankee stops generating power.  As Galloway wrote in Vermont Digger:

"Once the plant closes, that source of state revenue (the generation tax) will disappear. Recchia says Entergy should be required to continue to make some kind of payment to the state to make up for the economic impact of the sudden, unplanned shutdown."

In other words, McClaughry predicted the situation accurately.  The scenario (extract money and attempt to make decommissioning as expensive as possible) is unfolding exactly as McClaughry predicted it would unfold.

Note from blogger: "Sudden unplanned shutdown"?  Huh?

Second note from blogger:  Will these "generation tax" substitutes actually be used for Vermont Yankee employee assistance?  Your guess is as good as mine....

The Good News and the Bad News


Good News:  This is the state's final chance to extract money. In Andrew Stein's article in Vermont Digger (State Weighs What Conditions to Place on Vermont Yankee Closing) Stein quotes Ray Shadis, a long-time plant opponent.

"It is unclear at this point if Entergy VY, if it closes in 2014, will ever have to appear before the VPSB (Vermont Public Service Board), or for that matter, any state regulatory body ever again,” he (Shadis) wrote to the board. “Chopping the proposed period of extended operation really appears to narrow that possibility and proportionally heightens the need for the VPSB and the parties to ‘get it right.’”

Bad News:  It's not really bad news. More like "major uncertainty."  If the Public Service Board puts tens-of-millions-of-dollars of conditions on a certificate of public good, and Entergy had planned to operate the plant only for a few more months--what will Entergy do?  

It may not be worthwhile for Entergy to litigate in the hopes of merely several months operation.  Also, if Entergy doesn't sign the new CPG, they don't have to abide by its multi-million dollar conditions.  In other words, Entergy might quite reasonably decide not to sign, not to litigate, and simply to close the plant a few months earlier. 

I hope this would not happen, but it could. 

"Building better relations with Entergy" indeed!

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You can link to the complete, 50-page DPS filing from the Vermont Digger article.  I link to it here for convenience. I am always grateful when Vermont Digger links to the original documents. 

John McClaughry, the man who made the prediction, is vice president of the Ethan Allen Institute (www.ethanallen.org). The Energy Education Project (directed by Meredith Angwin) is part of the Ethan Allen Institute.