Entergy, Vermont Electric Co-Op, and Some Links

Entergy just announced the completion of a deal to sell Vermont Yankee power to Vermont Electric Co-Op. The deal is for power available after 2012, contingent on Vermont Yankee still running after 2012. The opening cost for the power is 4.9 cents kWh, not much more than the 4.5 cents Entergy is currently receiving in its existing contracts, and far less that the touted 5.8 cents of the HydroQuebec deal with other Vermont utilities. Both the Entergy deal and the HydroQuebec deal quote only the going-in rate, and move with the market in a mysterious way.

Entergy also announced that it did not get an offer on Vermont Yankee. I admit I was wrong. I thought Entergy would get an offer. My reasoning was right in some ways: other utilities see the value of the plant. It is not an old rust-bucket. As the plant spokesman, Larry Smith, stated in the press release: Although we received interest from a number of companies, the conclusion of the sale process, without a sale, was driven primarily by the uncertain political environment in Vermont," Smith said. "The plant's strong operating performance was attractive to potential buyers; the political uncertainty was not." However, my prediction that another company would make a contingent offer turned out to be wrong.

Meanwhile, as I was following the twitter stream, journalist Shay Totten tweeted that the CEO of Vermont Electric Co-operative found the Entergy press release misleading and said that the CEO, Dave Hallquist, plans to "do a lot of interviews tonight."

More information to come on this, no doubt.

Finally, I would like to recommend a few links from the past day or so.

• In today's Atomic Insights blog, Howard Shaffer discusses the evolution of Mark I containment.
• In Nuclear Green, Charles Barton describes the good, the bad, and the ugly about Fukushima and its press coverage.
• As I wrote two days ago, I thought Capacity Factor had the most reasonable assessment of the fall-out situation in Japan, though it was far more pessimistic than the BBC assessment. Unfortunately, I seem to have been right. The village that Capacity Factor projected should be evacuated is indeed being evacuated. The heavy fall-out is in a small area, but this is still not good news.
• I also wrote that I could not figure out the injuries at the plant. A list has now been published. The injuries are mostly due to the earthquake, tsunami, and industrial accidents, with a few due to radiation. None of the radiation injuries sounds serious, but we really don't know.
• In a more upbeat note, about 200 people displaced by the tsunami have found shelter at the Onogawa nuclear plant.

Japan and Probabilistic Risk Assessment

The Situation in Japan

The Fukushima reactors have power, but they are still struggling. Yesterday, Areva confirmed that TEPCO had just asked them for help. There is no announced change in the status of the reactors. However, reports of the spread of radiation are not looking good at all. I think Capacity Factor, once again, has the best analysis so far. He concentrates on the cesium fall-out, and does not agree with the optimistic assessment from BBC.

There is no doubt that the Japanese situation is serious. The question for people in Vermont about the safety of Vermont Yankee, however, is not so much about the consequences of a huge problem, but whether our safety precautions will avoid such problems. I think they will and I have reasons to think so. Among other things, we assess risk in a different way.

How the Nuclear Industry Assesses Risk

This morning, the New York Times had an article Japanese Rules For Nuclear Plants Depended on Old Science. It turns out that when the United States went to Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for nuclear plant evaluation, the Japanese did not. (The original plant designs rarely included PRA, because it was too new at the time. Re-evaluations and uprate licensing in the United States included it.)

Because the Japanese did not use this method, The Japanese estimates of tsunami damage and their defenses against it were inadequate. Here's a quote from the article about PRA:

"The Japanese fell behind," Mr. Hardy said. "Once they made the proclamation that this was the maximum earthquake, they had a hard time re-evaluating that as new data came in."

The Japanese approach, referred to in the field as "deterministic" -- as opposed to "probabilistic," or taking unknowns into account -- somehow stuck, said Noboru Nakao,

According to the article, the NRC uses "some" aspects of PRA in evaluating plants, but could use more. EPRI did considerable research in this area (though I was not one of the researchers) and I am sure that this research is available to the NRC.

If you don't use PRA, you are likely to not assess the situation as far out on the "improbable accident scenario" spectrum as you will if you use PRA. "Deterministic risk assessment" sounds safer, but it is not.

An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. We developed PRA, we use it, and we should probably use it more. It is clear to me that risk analysis in this country has been far more thorough than the analysis in Japan, and our plants are far safer.

Where was the Japanese NRC Equivalent When These Decisions Were Made?

I am going out on a limb here. I have been watching some Teaching Company videos on economics. One of the points made in the course is that the Japanese economic miracle of the 70s and 80s was due to close cooperation of industry and government. It seems to me that the entire situation of government-industry cooperation might have become too close and too cozy.

Nuclear opponents consider that the NRC is too cozy with the nuclear industry. From within the industry, however, the NRC looks much different. It looks adversarial.

Inspectors are rotated in and out of plants so they won't get friendly with the workers. Reviews of new types of plants take years, maybe decades. The NRC is truly a watchdog. This is typical of all regulation in the U.S. Regulators in the United States generally take an adversarial view of their industry. This adds to the safety (and the cost) of most industries in the United States.

The NRC has been doing a good job. I know that nuclear opponents will have a field day with this statement, but this is my opinion, and everything I read confirms it.

Graphic is The Great Wave from 36 Views of Mount Fuji by Hokusai

Standard Deviation Distribution Curve from Wikimedia

Blog Roll Update and Welcome to New Blogger

I want to welcome new blogger, Plain English Nuclear. The subheading of this blog is "Trying to Explain What All Those Numbers and Terms Really Mean." The blogger is a nuclear professional and the blog is a very welcome addition to the pro-nuclear blog roll!

I also want to welcome Phronesaiscal blog to my blog roll. This is a multi-person blog, and I have been reading Cheryl Rofer's posts on the blog regularly. However, since many of the topics were not closely akin to Vermont Yankee topics, I didn't have the blog on the Vermont Yankee visible blogroll. Recently, however, Rofer has been doing a great job of interpreting the news from Japan. Her background includes extensive experience understanding nuclear issues in the former Soviet Union areas. Today's blog is about how radiation exposure standards are set in various nations. I hope people will enjoy her blog!

Another not-new blog is Atomic Insights. This is one of the oldest pro-nuclear blogs. Recently Rod Adams moved it off the Blogger platform to its own URL, atomicinsights.com. I have updated the address in my blog roll. Congrats on the move, Rod, and congrats on the beautiful new format!

Also, I have added a new gadget to my blog: the email signup. With this, you can be notified when I put up a new post. Think how convenient this will be! No more searching through the twitter stream, desperately trying to determine if I have posted recently. (This assumes you hang on my every word.) Kidding aside, it is good to be able to sign up for blog alerts, and I hope my readers will find this gadget useful.

Potassium Iodide Is Not Your Friend: To Be Taken Only as Directed

Real Pills

Our local health food store sold out of potassium iodide within two days of the start of the Fukushima problems. There has been a run on potassium iodide tablets all over the world.

Potassium iodide, like other drugs, should only be taken when it is needed. Yet people in Vermont seem to feel they need it to protect them from radiation, when reports say that only very low levels of radiation from Fukushima will reach our coasts.

On the other hand, people may feel it is better to be safe than sorry. What is wrong with taking some pills as a prophylactic?

A lot, it turns out.

The Endocrinologist's Letter

A group of medical societies specializing in endocrinology recently issued a letter explaining why people should not take these pills unless they are actually exposed to significant quantities of radioactive iodine. On March 18, the following medical societies and association issued a statement on Radiation Risks to Health. The associations are:

• the American Association of Clinical Endocrinologists
• the American Thyroid Association
• The Endocrine Society,
• the Society of Nuclear Medicine

Here is a key quote from that letter:

However, KI should not be taken in the absence of a clear risk of exposure to a potentially dangerous level of radioactive iodine because potassium iodide can cause allergic reactions, skin rashes, salivary gland inflammation, hyperthyroidism or hypothyroidism in a small percentage of people. Since radioactive iodine decays rapidly, current estimates indicate there will not be a hazardous level of radiation reaching the United States from this accident. When an exposure does warrant KI to be taken, it should be taken as directed by physicians or public health authorities until the risk for significant exposure to radioactive iodine dissipates, but probably for no more than 1-2 weeks.

That is a pretty impressive list of side effects. Plus, you should only take the pills for a week or two at a time.

Other doctors are also concerned with prophylactic use of KI. As JoNel Aleccia, MSN health writer notes in a recent blog post, doctors are already seeing people with side effects from potassium iodide, and poison control centers are getting calls. The pills are particularly dangerous for people over forty, who run a comparatively low risk of thyroid cancer (if radionuclides were actually present) and a high risk of allergic reactions to KI.

Dr. Edward Maher, president of the Health Physics Society and on the board of the Ethan Allen Institute Energy Education Project, also forward this recently updated KI fact sheet, written in February of this year.

The conclusions are all the same. Don't take KI unless you need it.

And if that isn't enough, remember that K (potassium) is a beta-emitter, like tritium. It is the basis for the radioactivity in bananas. By taking a KI pill, you are deliberately increasing your exposure to internal beta radiation. As noted in my posts about bananas, you are not increasing your exposure by any significant amount. However, avoiding radiation may be another reason to not take the pills. Better to be safe than to be sorry?

Imaginary Pills

Last week, I gave a talk about Vermont and Japan to a local meeting of the American Nuclear Society. The discussion was serious and interesting, and we were lucky enough to have David Ropeik in attendance at the meeting. He is an expert in how people perceive risk. He pointed out that people like to feel they have some control over events. If keeping KI pills in the medicine cabinet makes a person feel prepared, what is the harm in it?

In all honesty, I had never looked at it this way. I presumed if you had the pills, you would take the pills. But maybe not. Maybe having the pills is an insurance policy. In my opinion, the person buying the KI pills is insuring against something that is extraordinarily unlikely to happen. Something it is not worth insuring against. For me, buying KI pills would be the equivalent of buying a special policy that insured me only against the possibility that a plane might fall into my house.

Still, that is my opinion, and obviously other people don't share this view of radiation risk in Vermont.

So my current advice would be: if you are worried about radioactive iodine from Japan affecting you in Vermont, buy KI pills. But for Pete's sake, don't take them!

Potassium Iodide Crystal Structure Graphic from Wikimedia

Snake Oil from Wikimedia

45h Carnival of Nuclear Energy Blogs

The 45th Carnival of Nuclear Energy Blogs is up at Idaho Samizdat. Some of the blogs have become excellent feeds of nuclear updates. The ANS Nuclear Cafe blog of the American Nuclear Society has twice-daily updates and links to all the important news sources on its Fukushima tab. Other blogs also provide updates. NEI has excellent white papers and graphics. Next Big Future covers world reactions. For example, the Polish Prime Minister supports their new nuclear project, saying "we can't succumb to hysteria about it."

Most of the bloggers this time take a philosophical view, getting this event is perspective. Margaret Harding notes the optimist's dilemma: pessimists never have to say they are sorry. If pessimists are right, they did a great prediction! If they are wrong, well, that's nice but next time won't be so lucky.

Gail Marcus also comments on the negative sides of expressing optimism. Rod Adams retreats from earlier optimism in an insightful post about why we still need nuclear energy, but we shouldn't underestimate the effects of this accident. Charles Barton discusses the public perception of nuclear safety, and I comment on information that we still don't know. Suzanne Hobbs of PopAtomic Studios encourages pro-nuclear people to cooperate in creative ways.

In other posts, Cheryl Rofer discusses leaks and breaks and radioactive water: where does it come from? Michele Kearney's Nuclear Wire Blog describes safety considerations for older reactors. Areva describes the effect of the accident on nuclear workers in this country. Canadian Energy Issues and Idaho Samizdat look toward the future, and how Fukushima will (or won't) affect new construction.

This is a more solemn blog than usual. Not really a carnival. It's more like a Greek philosophical symposium. Still, it is worth a visit, though you are more likely to drink a glass of red wine than eat cotton candy.

Don't forget to donate to the Nuclear Worker Relief fund, or other charities of your choice.

Tour of Brown's Ferry

I thought I would post this view of a BWR. They don't say which of the Brown's Ferry reactors this is, but they are all GE BWR units, very similar to Vermont Yankee.

Lessons Learned and Information Missing

Lessons Learned

Problems following the earthquake and the tsunami came hard and fast, but I decided that there are probably two root causes that could be lessons learned. My two lessons are:

- upgrading emergency preparedness, especially back-up power
- preventing hydrogen explosions.

There are huge problems at the fuel pools, and fuel pools are clearly another area for improved management. Still, if the Japanese reactors had had available back-up power and if they had been able to prevent hydrogen explosions, the fuel pools would have been fine.

I will try to cover back-up power, hydrogen explosions, and fuel pools in some blog posts. I'm starting with the easy one today: hydrogen explosions.

Hydrogen Explosions

During Three Mile Island, there was concern with a "hydrogen bubble." Therefore, preventing hydrogen explosions was addressed in this country in a major retrofit effort in the 1980s. Among other things, the NRC ordered American reactors to be retrofitted with special vents to prevent hydrogen from accumulating in the reactor buildings. These hardened vents are designed to vent hydrogen into the atmosphere in an emergency. Vermont Yankee and all other American reactors have them.

I don't know if the Japanese reactors were also retrofitted with hardened vents. A New York Times article today describes the current state of knowledge about the venting. It seems that the Japanese reactors were not retrofitted.

Missing Information?

The news came this morning that containment may be breached at Unit 3 and workers were contaminated in the turbine room with radioactive water. I do not know what this means, but I think NEI Nuclear Notes blog Friday Morning Update has the best description so far.

So far, we have had very contradictory news from Japan. For a while, it looked like containment was breached at #2. Then, it wasn't. Now, it looks like containment may be breached at #3. The fuel pools at #3 and #4 seem to take turns being the major problem. It's hard to follow and pretty much impossible to blog about.

We keep getting news, but it is constantly changing. Nobody in Japan seems to be aggregating it. For example, I have heard that the following things happened at the Fukushima complex:

• One man was killed in a crane, during the initial earthquake
• Three men were hospitalized later for radiation exposure
• Four men were hurt in one of the explosions
• Two men were missing after the tsunami
• Three men had beta burns from radioactive water

And our total is what? The man in the crane is rarely mentioned anymore. I find it very confusing. I know that there are huge infrastructure problems in Japan, but somehow, I feel that in America, there would be a reporter on some TV station saying:

"With the three men contaminated by radiation at Fukushima 3 this morning, our injury total at the reactor complex has risen to (fill in the blank)" etc.

However, obviously Japan is in shambles, because other areas are equally opaque. A hydro power dam burst and obliterated 1800 homes, but only "according to some reports." I have seen scattered articles on this dam, but very few. For example, I saw this article in the trade press for hydro power. What happened at that dam?

Similarly, Chiba refinery burned for ten days (or more) with very little coverage, and no word of any injuries or deaths due to the fire. An early video of the fire is below. It wasn't a teeny-tiny fire. You would think we would have heard more about it.

My Conclusions

I will attempt to blog about what I know about the Japanese situation, always remembering that I know very little.

Fukushima photo, 1975, from Wikimedia Commons. Made based on [http://w3land.mlit.go.jp/WebGIS/ National Land Image Information (Color Aerial Photographs)], Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism